



A
PLAIN ANSWER
TO THE
CURSORY REMARKS.

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TO THE

MISREPRESENTATIONS AND CALUMNIES

CONTAINED IN THE

CURSORY REMARKS

OF

A NEAR OBSERVER.

BY A MORE ACCURATE OBSERVER.

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PLAIN ANSWER,

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THE public has so much interest and concern in the real character of those who either are at present, or are at any time likely to be called to the management of the affairs of the nation, that every fair attempt to develop their character, or to appreciate duly their pretensions, is justly entitled to general approbation. But as every such endeavour is likely to answer a beneficial purpose, so every attempt to mislead upon this point has a hurtful and mischievous tendency. It is one of the evils of party, that it represents its adherents as eminent in every great and good quality, and its opponents as destitute of every thing that is meritorious. Ingenuity is employed on all sides to bend things and circumstances to suit a purpose, and the readers of polemical discussions will not approach

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proach the truth unless they strip the facts which are stated to them of their exaggeration, and subtract much both from the panegyric and the censure which the zeal of party-writers induces them to heap very plentifully, as the case may be, upon their friends or their enemies.

It is usual among these writers to cast a veil over the intention to praise or to condemn, except as the most rigid truth dictates. The "*Near Observer*" has not forgotten this decent custom;—his veil, however, covers, but does not conceal. It is of curious workmanship, wrought with some ingenuity, but of so thin a texture, that a distant observer may see without difficulty the specks and deformities which it is intended to hide. I should not, however, attempt to remove this veil, or to point out the malevolent spirit, and the misrepresentations which pervade the "*Cursory Remarks*," if they had not been ushered into public notice with a degree of solemn and confident assertion, upon delicate and interesting points, well calculated to make an impression, and if these misrepresentations, glaring as they are, had not received *a sanction*, likely to induce the public to give them credit. It is true, they are the assertions of an anonymous

mous writer; but let it be recollected that some of them relate to transactions of a confidential nature, in which the Ministers took a principal part; and when those in *his* confidence, assist in the circulation of the work, they by that act lend their name and authority to the principal statements which it contains, and express their sense of the propriety of its publication.

When the Near Observer thinks (most mistakenly) that it would have been so easy for Mr. Pitt, to have controuled and guided the parliamentary conduct of *Mr. Canning*, it will not be thought unreasonable in me to suppose that Mr. Addington may have some influence over the conduct of the *Secretaries of the Treasury*; and when I am told that Mr. Addington has been *neutral*, that he has even expressed his disapprobation of the pamphlet which I am noticing, I ask whether neutrality is justifiable upon such an occasion? I ask in what school that morality has been learnt, which teaches us to permit others to promote that, which our own conscience obliges us to disapprove and to condemn?

I agree with the Near Observer when he tells Mr. Addington that “ *he cannot be his friend and his flatterer too ;*” but I fear, I shall very much disagree with him when I consider in which of these characters he appears. As he cannot flatter, so, he assures us, “ he has nothing exaggerated, and set down nothing in malice ;” the present Ministers he represents as “ faithful, able, vigorous, fortunate,” and Mr. Addington as possessing “ judgment, knowledge, firmness,” (Gracious God !) “ equanimity.” This is surely enough in a writer who “ *exaggerates nothing,*” who is “ no flatterer,” and who cannot even venture to promise Mr. Addington that what he says “ will soothe his vanity.” Mr. Pitt, Lord Grenville, and Mr. Windham, are stated to be the leaders of a faction which is “ corrupt and perfidious”—“ unprincipled and profligate ;” hard words ! and particularly when they flow from the pen of a writer, who “ *sets down nothing in malice.*”

It is much to be wished, that he had given us some proof of the claim of the Administration to his high eulogium ; or the title of Mr. Addington to the rare qualities which he has ascribed to him ;

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qualities, the use and exercise of which appear so essential to our welfare, perhaps to our existence, at this awful crisis : but he has left to me the ungracious task of examining these pretensions, for I cannot admit the truth and justice of them upon mere assertion ; nor can I in conscience, like the *Near Observer*, first consider the expeditions against Egypt and Copenhagen as *hopeless*, when the object is to detract from the fame of Mr. Pitt, and admit that when they turned out fortunate the merit of their success should belong to Mr. Addington.

But if the panegyric of the Administration, and the praise of Mr. Addington, rest upon assertion alone, and if little or nothing appear to support them, except the assurances of an anonymous writer, that he is no flatterer, distinct grounds are brought forward, for the attack which is made upon the character of Mr. Pitt, Lord Grenville, and Mr. Windham. These grounds are,—*the time, the manner, and the occasion, of their quitting their official situations ;—the promise given and withdrawn, of “ constant, active, and zealous support ;” —the circumstances of the negotiation for the return of Mr. Pitt into office ;—and the general conduct of these persons in Parliament.*

liament. These are points which it is necessary to examine.

In adverting to the circumstances of the resignation of the late Ministers, and the arrangements which ensued, for the formation of a new administration, I am unwilling to dwell more particularly upon the transaction, or upon the remarks of the Near Observer upon it, than is absolutely necessary to place the subject in its true light. The Public are principally interested in this transaction, inasmuch as the characters of statesmen are affected by it. A curiosity to be acquainted with the details of every interesting political event, is perfectly natural; but there certainly exists no imperious necessity for the gratification of this curiosity in every instance, nor have the people any right to complain of a blameable concealment on the part of his Majesty's Ministers, merely because the progress and circumstances of a transaction involving in it the exercise of his Majesty's undoubted prerogative are not minutely detailed to them. This observation is rendered necessary by the manner in which the subject before us has been treated by the Near Observer, who makes it a principal charge against Mr. Pitt and
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his friends, that they quitted their posts without fully explaining to the people the causes of their resignation.

When it was announced that a change was about to take place in his Majesty's councils, and the public were thereby thrown into a state of "consternation" more justly than consistently described by our author, the desire of the public to be acquainted with the causes of this event was certainly very strong. Various rumours prevailed as to the causes of the resignation. As far as was consistent with their duty to their Sovereign, the Ministers did not hesitate to acquaint the public with the motives which had induced them to relinquish their situations.—“Feeling it,” they said, “an incumbent duty upon them to propose a measure on the part of Government, which they thought of great public importance,—when they met with circumstances which rendered it impossible for them to propose it, as a measure of Government, they felt it equally inconsistent with their *duty* and their honour, any longer to remain a part of that Government.”

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They at the same time explained to the public the general outline of the measure to which they alluded. Upon this topic it is quite unnecessary to enlarge; especially as there is reason to suppose that (as frequently happens upon similar occasions) the question, in its course, took a very different shape from that which it originally bore; and had a similar difference of opinion existed, with respect to any *other* question *attended by the same circumstances*, the result would, in all probability, have been exactly the same. Of the essential importance of the question itself, and of the nature and tendency of the circumstances attending its discussion, the Ministers were to judge for themselves. They considered that the line of conduct which they adopted, was equally conformable to their public duty, as it was consistent with their private feelings.

Considering this short explanation as furnishing a plain and intelligible reason for the resignation, I should feel it unnecessary to say more upon the subject, but for the extraordinary motives which the Near Observer has assigned for the conduct of Mr. Pitt and his friends upon the occasion, or rather which he thinks proper to
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suppose to be the motives ascribed to them by the world at large. The character and conduct of the Ministers who resigned, from the earliest period of their political lives, and the nature of the charges usually brought against them by their most violent opponents, are equally inconsistent with the supposition of their having been influenced by "*déspondency* and *apprehension*." What? Is it probable that Ministers, who had seen Jacobin principles gaining daily strength in Britain, Ireland in open rebellion, the fleet in a state of mutiny, the bank supposed to be insolvent, the kingdom threatened with famine, and a people murmuring against the load of taxes, and the war by which they were occasioned? Is it probable that Ministers, whom these evils could not appal, should have yielded to feelings of despair, and begun to be apprehensive of our danger, at the moment when the malignant principles of Jacobinism had been almost eradicated from the country which gave them birth; when they had accomplished a measure which they considered as the best hope of the future tranquillity of Ireland; when our fleets were triumphing in every part of the world (and at that instant preparing a dreadful stroke for a new foe); when public credit was completely

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restored, and the nation reconciled to the exertions which the state of Europe called for at their hands?

This representation of the state of the country at the beginning of 1801, is very different from that which has been exhibited by the Near Observer ; and since, with what consistency I will presently enquire, he lays great stress upon the *period* at which the late Ministers quitted office, I will shortly examine the circumstances of that period.

He represents “ the subjugation of the best “ half of the Continent as ratified at Luneville ;” and the “ rest of the Continent as France, Spain, Italy, Piedmont, Switzerland, the courses of the lower Rhine into the Ocean, the Seven United Provinces, and the Low Countries absorbed !” To the correctness of this statement I have certainly nothing to object, however surprised I may be, that these topics should have been placed by our author in so prominent a light ; that the zealous partizan of a Ministry, who had given their *sanction* to the subjugation of half of the Continent, and to the absorption of the remainder in the enormous
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power of France, should love to dwell upon these unfortunate events, and to adduce them as an instance of the *desperate* situation of the country under the late Administration. A state of things which the present Government—"successful,"—"fortunate,"—"vigorous,"—"prudent,"—had solemnly ratified or tacitly consented to !

But as for the remainder of the statement of the Near Observer, I can neither assent to the correctness of his facts, or the justness of his conclusions.—What ground is there for saying, that the war had *now* grown unpopular and hopeless ? and to assert, that " the single disappointment received at Ferrol, caused more discontent and despondency than had arisen from all our mistakes and misfortunes at earlier periods of the war ?" To assertions like these, unsupported by any proofs, it is difficult to oppose any thing but general contradiction. It would be a most extravagant supposition to imagine, that the fortune of the war could have been materially affected by the failure or success of this expedition. To the Journals of Parliament, however, I may refer my author for a denial of his position, that the war was more un-

popular than at former periods. As far as we can judge of the national feelings by the public expression of them, it was certainly less unpopular in 1801 than in 1795, 1796, and 1797.

But the war, says our author, had also grown "hopeless." I have no hesitation in confessing, nor does the confession imply any thing derogatory from the honor of the country or the wisdom of its late Ministers, that at the conclusion of the Preliminary Treaty, and for some time before, the probability of our obtaining that which was a part of the object of the war, namely, the delivery of the Powers of Europe from the state of oppression to which they had been reduced by the enormous power of France, had become very slight indeed. The period had, for a second time, arrived, when * "the danger, the difficulty, the risk of continuing the contest had increased, while the hope of complete ultimate success was diminished." 'The Near Observer's assertion, brought in without any apparent connection with the subject, "that the nature and character of the war had been early mistaken, and that its principles and objects had repeatedly appeared to change," is *one* of those

* Mr. Pitt's Speech, Feb. 3, 1800.

wilfull and perverse misrepresentations which he has borrowed from the “ Old Opposition,” and to which I deem it unnecessary to give any more particular answer in this place, than that one of the principal objects of the war having been attained, our chief attention was afterwards directed to the other, and that the means by which we hoped to accomplish *this* varied according to the circumstances of the times, the situation and disposition of the other Powers of Europe, and of France herself.

How far “ the capacity of the persons entrusted with the conduct of the war” can be affected by the history of the Treaty of El Arisch, is a subject which has been repeatedly discussed ;* but if, indeed, the expedition prepared
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* On the 15th of December, 1799, the British Government having reason to believe, that proposals would be made for the evacuation of Egypt by the French troops, upon condition of being suffered to return unmolested to France, sent instructions to Lord Keith not to consent to any such convention. The bad faith with which such engagements had been kept by the French Government, and *the danger which would arise at that particular period, from the return to Europe of so large a force*, appear to be the motives which governed the conduct of his Majesty’s Ministers, in
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for the recovery of Egypt was incompetent to its object, if his Majesty's *late* Ministers have no claim to the merit of "that most happy and stupendous service," I would ask upon what are founded the pretensions of the present Administration to it? Is it that the principal battle which was fought in the campaign, and which may be said to have decided the fate of Egypt,

giving those orders. As soon as they learnt that, before the receipt of these orders, Sir Sidney Smith had concluded a Convention upon the terms of the return of the French troops to their own country, although without any stipulation to prevent their serving immediately in Europe, the British Government sent orders to the Admiral not to obstruct the execution of this treaty.

Before these second orders reached Lord Keith, he had, according to his instructions, notified his former orders to the French General, the consequence of which was, the immediate renewal of hostilities. What then is meant by the violation of the treaty of El-Arisch? the whole responsibility to which the late Ministers are subjected by this transaction, depends upon the *policy* of giving the orders of 15th of December, 1799. In discussing this question we must remember, that at this time the chief hope of the war rested upon the events of the Continental campaign, which, in the quarter that would in all probability have been principally affected by the return of the French troops, was terminated in favour of the enemy, by a hard fought battle, and which, at one period, was even considered as gained by our allies.

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took place upon the very day that Mr. Addington became the First Lord of the Treasury? or that Lord Hobart opened the dispatches addressed to Mr. Dundas, giving an account of that glorious event?

To support his opinion of the inadequacy of the Egyptian expedition, the Near Observer quotes the authority of a very gallant British officer. To this authority I will only say, that the opinion of those who have been victorious, that the means put into their hands did not afford the probability of victory, is always to be received with much allowance. It is not improbable that the Ministers might have been acquainted with circumstances totally unknown to the officers of the army, which, in their judgment, would sufficiently counteract any disparity of force between us and our enemies. But what pretext has our author for his affectedly unwilling avowal, that no Minister would be sanguine enough to expect the success of the expedition, which was prepared by the late Government to assist our negotiations with the Northern Powers? I am as unwilling to enter into naval as into military details, but at least I may be permitted to say, that the circumstance

stance of the object of the expedition being accomplished, with respect to one Power, at the very sight of the British fleet, and to another, by the operations of a *detachment* from it, are not very favourable to the opinion which our author thinks it “were unjust to dissemble.”*

* It is said in the Cursory Remarks that “Lord Whitworth signed a Treaty of *Adjournment*, at the expence of some implied and virtual *admissions* which in happier times could never have been *extorted* from a British Cabinet.” Let it be remembered, that by the *Preliminary Convention* of the 29th of August, 1800, it was stipulated, that his Danish Majesty should *suspend his convoys*, until the conclusion of a Definitive Treaty. If, therefore, there was any extortion in this transaction, it consisted in our obliging our adversary, as a preliminary, (*pendente lite*) to give up the object in dispute, until we should be enabled, with greater means in our hands of enforcing our demands, to treat with him for the final acquiescence in them. When it afterwards appeared that notwithstanding this, the King of Denmark had joined the other Northern Powers, in a treaty extremely injurious to our interests, and contrary to the ancient usages of Europe, his Majesty’s *late* Ministers lost no time in preparing an expedition for the purpose of enforcing their just pretensions. *This* expedition obtained that victory by which “the rostral column of our naval enterprize, had been crowned,” and led to that Convention upon which the *present* Ministers rest so much of their claim to our applause. Whether by this treaty they obtained for the country all that we had a right to expect, is a question upon which great difference of opinion exists, but which it is now unnecessary to discuss.

I wish I were not compelled to touch upon another subject upon which our author dwells—The lamented illness of a Sovereign who has uniformly lived in the affections of his people. I yield not to the Near Observer in every feeling of heartfelt affliction, which so universally prevailed on account of that calamity.

Aware of the delicacy of this topic, I cannot listen without indignation to the insinuation, that at such a moment his Majesty's late Ministers thought proper to retire from his service. They had laid their offices at his Majesty's feet, days and weeks previous to this most alarming and distressing event. But my observation, *which is not very distant*, has deceived me much, if Mr. Pitt, at the time of doing so, *did not make a distinct offer to retain his situation, until the war should be concluded, and the country relieved from its most pressing difficulties*, provided that he could be assured that no attempt would be made in the mean time to prejudge the important question, the difference of opinion on which, had led to his resignation. Although this offer was not accepted, his resignation was nevertheless suspended, by the event which immediately followed, of his Majesty's unfortunate

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illness. Until his Majesty's recovery, he not only remained nominally in office, but continued to act during the whole of the period, as Minister, and retained as much as ever the chief direction of affairs.

These facts require no comment. The public will not hesitate to decide, whether there is the slightest ground for the insinuation of "apprehension and despondency," and whether the circumstances which I have mentioned are not a sufficient answer to all the misrepresentations respecting *the period* of the resignation.

It is unnecessary to state the circumstances which prevented the proposition to which I have alluded from being carried into effect; but such there were, and the new Ministers in consequence entered upon their offices soon after the happy recovery of his Majesty; which leads me to the second topic to which I have proposed to advert, namely, "the promise, given and withdrawn, on the part of Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville, of constant, zealous, and active support of the present Administration." Mr. Pitt undoubtedly, when he retired from office, felt convinced that under the circumstances of the period his Majesty

jesty had selected for his advisers persons by whom it was probable that the Government of the country would be wisely and safely administered. He felt them, therefore, entitled to his support, and, as well as Lord Grenville, gave them his assurance of it. To give to any set of men a promise of constant support, *let their conduct be what it would*, is as inconsistent with every idea of public duty, as it certainly is with common sense or common honesty. Neither Mr. Pitt nor Lord Grenville ever gave, nor did Mr. Addington understand that he had received, such a promise. If, therefore, as the Near Observer so pompously *avers*, the assurance had been couched in the precise words, “constant, active, and zealous support,” it would have needed no sophistry to give to the promise a limitation. But what is the real fact? The words which are quoted by our author were made use of by *Lord Grenville* in a speech,* in which he claimed for the new Administration the confidence of the country, as consisting of men who had constantly approved the principles upon which he and his colleagues had enjoyed the confidence, and received the support of the

* 20th March, 1801.

nation, and who had both publicly and privately professed their intention of continuing to act upon the same general system which had been adopted by their predecessors.

As such, his Lordship said they should have his “constant, active, and zealous support.” With respect to Mr. Pitt, it is not very necessary to inquire what were the particular words in which he conveyed to his successors his assurance of support; but in this case, as in that of Lord Grenville, there was not only an implied, but an *express* limitation to the promise. And Mr. Addington could tell the Near Observer, that out of the *three points* which Mr. Pitt, upon this occasion, selected as essential conditions of his support, *two* are those upon which he has expressed his disapprobation of the measures of the present Government.

Such was the nature of the assurances of support given by Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville to the present Administration. Let me ask how far the subsequent conduct of these two Statesmen has subjected them to the heavy charge of a breach of faith brought against them by the author of the *Cursory Remarks*?

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With respect to Lord Grenville, he looked upon the terms of the treaties by which the war had been concluded, the manner in which they were negotiated, and several other measures which took place at the same time, not only as a departure from the principles upon which he had offered his support—but as affording a proof of the incapacity of Ministers, sufficient to authorize and require a systematic opposition. This I consider as the public principle upon which he has acted, and which the Near Observer denies to exist, with respect to any person who has opposed the present Government.

As Mr. Pitt has never commenced a systematic opposition to the present Ministers, the remarks of the Near Observer apply only to the circumstance of his having occasionally expressed his disapprobation of some of their proceedings, and perhaps of having also suggested to them measures which he thought essentially necessary to the safety and welfare of the country.

I shall not enter minutely into a discussion of the merits of the different questions upon which he has differed in opinion with the Ministers. If I were to point out one principle

ciple which seems to have guided him throughout, it is the disapprobation of a want of system, and of a wavering, temporizing, indecisive conduct.

But the Near Observer is not content with censuring Mr. Pitt for having taken the liberty to speak his sentiments in Parliament—he accuses him of a breach of promise, because he did not attend in the House of Commons to give his assistance to Government upon every question of importance. I leave our author to reconcile this accusation with his former expression of “officious support.” If Mr. Pitt had not been prevented by the circumstances of his health from attendance to parliamentary duties at the period alluded to, I should have asked the Near Observer whether he was quite sure that Mr. Pitt was not acting *kindly* towards Mr. Addington in forbearing to deliver his opinion upon his conduct upon the important points which were then under discussion?

With respect to the confirmation of the promise of support, which is stated to have been given “with some form and solemnity” upon her Majesty’s birth-day, the ceremony took place
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only in the fertile imagination of the Near Observer. Mr. Addington was not unacquainted,* at that time, with Mr. Pitt's disapprobation of his general views and statements of finance, and of his management in several points of our foreign relations.

I come now to speak of a transaction, upon which I particularly request the attention of my readers. I know that I tread upon delicate ground, but in treading it I shall not deviate from the path of truth. Upon a question interesting in itself, upon which curiosity had been much excited, and upon which, from the nature of it, little could be publicly known, the "Near Observer" seems to have thought that confident and positive assertion could not fail to make an impression. No species of falsehood is so certain of passing current upon the world, as that which has some degree of truth (however slight) for its foundation; and the misrepresentation of this transaction, however gross, appears to be the misrepresentation of a person who had the means

* The Near Observer asserts that by the influence of Lord Grenville Mr. Addington was deprived of Mr. Pitt's friendship, "notwithstanding every one of his measures has received his support and approbation."

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(though certainly little of the inclination) of stating its circumstances with correctness and precision.

It is very far from my intention to set down all the particulars which have come to my knowledge upon this transaction, however well authenticated they may be. Indeed I should not have entered at all upon the subject, if it had not been for the purpose of correcting mistatement, and refuting and exposing calumny. I confine myself therefore within the limits of the "Near Observer's" misrepresentations, premising only that no farther circumstances with which I am acquainted, vary in any degree the general complexion of the transaction. If I have mistaken or misconceived any point, I call upon Mr. Addington, or any of his friends, to correct my error.

Towards the end of March, or at the beginning of April, upon the eve of war, after it was distinctly known to Mr. Addington that Mr. Pitt strongly disapproved of some of the leading measures of his Government, and after an overture had been made on the part of Mr. Addington, too foolish, I had almost said, too insulting

ing to be noticed, a distinct proposition, (originating, not, as has been insinuated, with Lord Melville, but entirely with Mr. Addington himself,) was made to Mr. Pitt, the object of which was his return to the official situation he formerly held in the Administration; and, as I understand, the arrangement was to have taken place whenever the negotiation then pending with France should have been brought to a conclusion. It was also signified, that vacancies would be made for the purpose of admitting Lord Melville into the Cabinet, and some other of Mr. Pitt's friends into different official situations. To this proposition Mr. Pitt replied, that he would not enter upon the question of arrangements, *until he was distinctly informed by a message from the highest quarter, that his services were thought essential*; that if so called upon, in spite of the precarious state of his health, he should not decline the offer of his best advice and assistance; that he was fully aware of the great and increasing difficulties of the country; and that he saw the necessity of *a strong, vigorous, and efficient Government*. That if called upon by his Majesty, he should feel it to be his duty to propose an Administration consisting principally of the members of the present and of

the late Government; that in the general arrangement which he should submit for his Majesty's consideration, he should, if they assented, include the Lords *Grenville* and *Spencer*, but that he should press no person whatever upon his Majesty, only reserving to himself the power of declining the undertaking altogether, if he could not form such a government as would enable him, in his judgment, to conduct the affairs of the nation with a fair probability of success. No *sine qua non* was insisted upon, as the "Near Observer" alledges with respect to the admission of Lord Grenville or of any other person into the Cabinet. All that Mr. Pitt required was, that he should be at liberty to submit to his Majesty whatever he thought best for his Majesty's service, unfettered by any previous condition, and he positively declined committing himself upon the question of particular arrangements until his Majesty's pleasure had been distinctly signified to him.

Such, I may venture to assert, was the substance and spirit of Mr. Pitt's conduct, through the whole of the transaction. What was that of Mr. Addington? In bringing forward the proposition of which I have spoken, he endeavoured

voured to make it a preliminary, that Lord Grenville should not, in the first instance, be included in any arrangement whatever. On the grounds already stated, Mr. Pitt refused to listen to such an exclusion, or to any other particular stipulation previous to laying his ideas before his Majesty. How far, after knowing Mr. Pitt's determination upon this point, Mr. Addington, for a time, felt, or expressed, a disposition on his part to accede to it, I will not take upon me to assert ; but it is, I believe, pretty certain, that after an interval of deliberation, and after consulting with his colleagues, he declared ultimately, that nothing could induce him to afford even the chance of admitting Lord Grenville into the Cabinet, and that this determination would allow of no change. His Majesty of course was not advised to send to Mr. Pitt, and Mr. Addington's proposition fell to the ground.

If this be a correct statement of this transaction, (and if it be not, I again call upon Mr. Addington or any of his friends to contradict any part of it) I ask what ground is there for describing it as "*a negotiation set on foot by Mr. Pitt for his return to office ?*" What pretence is there

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for calling it “*a scramble for place?*” What foundation for the base insinuation, that to the disappointment occasioned by the failure of this negotiation, not to fair and honest opinion upon public grounds, is to be imputed the disapprobation which Mr. Pitt has at any time shewn of any of the measures of the Government? Mr. Pitt was *invited*, (without any previous step taken on his part) to a negotiation, the professed object of which was, to place him at the head of the Government; instead of impatiently grasping at office, he declined the proposal, because it was coupled with conditions inconsistent with what he felt due to his public situation, and with his views of the public service. With respect to the motives for his subsequent conduct, I have sufficiently answered all unworthy insinuations on that head already, by mentioning a fact which will not be contradicted—that Mr. Addington knew of Mr. Pitt’s decided disapprobation of some of his principal measures, before this overture was made.

Mr. Addington evidently wished for the assistance of Mr. Pitt to strengthen *his* government, and this desire increased with the difficulty of his situation. It is equally evident, that

that Mr. Pitt had no inclination, whether from disapprobation of their general measures, from objection to any of the steps taken in the negotiation with France, or from any other cause, to agree to take office merely as an *accession* to the present Administration. Amidst the difficulties with which we are surrounded, many persons may naturally wish, that Mr. Pitt had lent his assistance to the Government in any manner in which it would have been received ; because the insufficiency of the present Administration, in our critical state, is very generally felt, and because Mr. Pitt would have infused energy and vigour into their councils, and would have been a “ tower of strength ” to them at this perilous moment. But surely it was for him to appreciate the talents and qualifications of those with whom he was to risk his character, and to consider upon what terms he could return to office, consistently with his own credit and with the public interest. None can question his right to determine upon this point for himself.

As it was not proposed, that this arrangement should have taken place till the negotiations with France had been brought to a conclusion, and as at the period of which I am speaking, the
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war appeared to be inevitable, it could not have been objected to the Lords Grenville and Spencer (as I have heard it objected to them during the late feverish and fretful peace) that their dispositions were too warlike. Indeed I never heard that the mention of the name of Lord *Spencer* had on any account excited the slightest dissatisfaction. It would indeed have been most extraordinary if it had—a nobleman of irreproachable and amiable character, and who had presided, in the last war, over one of the principal departments of the state with great ability and success. It will be curious to examine the ground of the rigid and severe proscription which was applied to Lord Grenville.

His parliamentary conduct had been marked by strong animadversions upon the measures of his Majesty's Ministers,* and on the discussion of the treaty of peace appeared to have taken the shape of direct and unqualified opposition. He represented its terms as totally inadequate to our just pretensions—he even ventured to doubt the security of the peace, and the pacific mind with which the First Consul of France was supposed to have concluded it. It would be foreign to my

* Vide Parliamentary Debates, Nov. 3, 1801, and May 4, 1802.

purpose to discuss the correctness of these opinions; but at least I may be permitted to say now, that they rather shew the sagacity and penetration of Lord Grenville's mind than furnish any just ground for his exclusion altogether from office, and particularly since Ministers have made that extraordinary confession (extraordinary only as coupled with their conduct and professions during the interval) that "the period which had elapsed since the conclusion of the definitive treaty had been marked with one continued series of aggression, violence, and insult on the part of the French Government."*

But Lord Grenville is accused of using harsh and uncivil language; and the "Near Observer" tells us that "*absurd, incapable*, and grosser epithets, were liberally applied to his Majesty's Councils and Ministers, and by no Member of either House more frequently than by his Lordship." The use of expressions more harsh and severe than the occasion justifies, on which they are applied, is always objectionable. It often manifests ill humour, and always bad taste. But it is an evil which carries its own remedy along with it; for it tends more to defeat than to for-

* Vide Declaration on the breaking out of the war.

ward the purpose it is meant to promote. I wish the "Near Observer" had profited by his own admonition, and that he had refrained from the still harsher and more calumnious epithets which he has thought fit so profusely to bestow on the conduct of Mr. Pitt, Lord Grenville, Mr. Windham, and Mr. Canning. He would tell me, perhaps, that he has only paid Lord Grenville in his own coin ; but he has paid him with most usurious interest, and with base metal. But are harsh expressions in debate quite unpardonable? Has Mr. Addington always been so unforgiving and implacable? A Right Reverend Prelate, who has never concealed his indignation at the peace, or his opinion of the Ministers themselves, was the first whom they promoted. It cannot have escaped Mr. Addington's observation, how nicely, while he was *fishing for office*, (to use his own expression) Mr. Tierney regulated his forbearance by his chance, and how correctly they varied together. I could point out occasions on which hope seemed to have deserted him, and on which, in the House of Commons, he expressed himself towards Mr. Addington in the harsh and unqualified language of despair; yet he is not only forgiven, but rewarded. What shall I say of another new convert? If the terms *absurd* and *incapable*

incapable are thought very opprobrious and quite unpardonable, how has Mr. Addington been induced to forgive the still harsher and coarser language of Mr. Sheridan ?* Is it that Lord Grenville is supposed to desire an office which is already occupied, and that Mr. Sheridan *says* he will not take one? or is it that a different rule is to be applied to Lord Grenville, and to every other person, and that the public are to be deprived of the official services of an able Statesman, from the effect of private pique and personal resentment ?

For never can I endure to hear the surmise so industriously propagated, and assigned also by the “Near Observer” as the cause of his Lordship’s exclusion,—that “there is an obstacle, if appearances are not very deceitful, to the admission of Lord Grenville into office even *higher*

* “When an election committee is formed, the watch word is to shorten the business *by knocking out the brains*, that is, by striking from the committee list the names of those gentlemen who may happen to understand the subject. In this sense Mr Pitt now has knocked out the brains of the Administration.” Vide Mr. Sheridan’s speech in the House of Commons, 16th Feb. 1801. Vide, also, Mr. Sheridan’s speech 14th May 1802, in which he represents the present Administration as the *sitting part* of the former.

than Mr. Addington's reluctance." Indecent insinuation! Whom, I ask, whose talents, whose acquirements, whose services would be advantageous to the staté, has the high Personage referred to ever proscribed? Away then with these shifts and pretences, the refuge of every Minister who shrinks from his own responsibility. It is most unseemly, as well as unconstitutional, to give out that any thing ungracious can arise in the quarter alluded to; in a quarter to which, from experience, the people of this country look up for every thing which is becoming, just, and honourable; for every thing which is best calculated to promote their interest, their happiness, and their prosperity.

It is certainly not my intention to enter into the comparative merits of the *projet* presented at Lisle and the Treaty of Amiens. Volumes may be written without settling a question which is now of little import in itself, and which is not to be decided alone by the advantages of the terms proposed by the *projet* or attained by the Treaty, but by a comparison of those terms with the relative state and prospects of the British Empire and France at the different periods referred

ferred to, and by various other general considerations. But I cannot consider the representation made by the "Near Observer" of the state of things at either of these periods as in any degree correct. We were neither so reduced at Amiens, nor in so prosperous a state as he would insinuate at Lisle. I cannot agree that France was "mistress of Egypt" during our negotiation at Amiens; nor, if I did, could I consider it as a reason why we should have accepted less advantageous terms. Neither can the "confederation of Kings from the bosom of the north" be justly stated as placing us under a disadvantage in that negotiation, for that confederation may be considered as having been dissolved by the glorious victory at Copenhagen, obtained a very few days after the first overtures for peace were made. As little can I agree that we were entitled to more favourable terms than those which we were willing to have accepted from France at Lisle, because (it is said) we treated "at the moment of one of her revolutions." The terms were offered previous to the revolution alluded to of the 4th September 1797. It was that revolution which broke off the negotiation. Instead of the powers of Europe "being ready to

renew the war at our side" they appeared to have deserted us. The Treaty of Leoben* had been signed, and that of Campo Formio was about to be concluded. The stoppage of the Bank had created consternation and embarrassment, and the mutiny in the fleet had spread around us general despondency. The circumstances and situation of the country were totally different at the periods of our negotiations at Lisle and at Amiens, and that difference was certainly not in favour of the former period. I cannot see therefore why the "basis of the Treaty of Amiens," is to be considered as necessarily "traced at Lisle," or why "the *projet* of Lord Grenville was a circle out of which his successors could not tread." These assertions are made perhaps in some degree to shew the diplomatic skill displayed by us at Amiens, but chiefly to prove the inconsistency of Lord Grenville in offering the *projet* and in disapproving the Treaty. From this charge he exculpated himself very ably and successfully on the discussion of that Treaty itself.†

* The Treaty of Leoben was signed 18th April, that of Campo Formio 17th Oct. 1797.

† Vide Woodfall's Debates 3d Nov. 1801.

Of Mr. Windham, who, it is well known, objected strenuously to the Treaty of Amiens, it is said, that since he quitted his office, " he has made the important confession that he had always disapproved the projet offered by Lord Grenville to the French Directory." It is then asked, " is it consistent to conceal opinions as a Minister and promulge them at the head of a party ?" Certainly Mr. Windham can seldom be reproached for *concealing opinions* ; and I had always believed that his disapproval of the attempt to treat at Lisle had been very generally known, even while he was in the cabinet : but I have no difficulty in saying, that it may be justifiable to conceal opinions as a Minister, which there may be no impropriety in avowing publicly when that restraint is removed, which is imposed upon a Member of the Administration differing from his colleagues. It cannot be supposed that the Members of the Cabinet Council are unanimous upon every question which is there decided, and it would be unfit that each Member should retire because he may disapprove of the particular measure which is adopted. If he really thinks that by continuing a Member of the Cabinet, under such circumstances, he is more likely to forward his general public purposes

poses, than by quitting it, every consideration of conscience and of honour calls upon him to remain, and it is his duty to resign his opinion upon the particular question on which he differs.

But the great inconsistency of Mr. Windham, and of those whom the *Moniteur* had termed the "War Faction," is considered as arising out of their objection to the peace, and their hesitation to assent to the necessity of the renewal of the war, when they found it had been declared. "When we see the Right Hon. Gentleman (Mr. Windham) in full fruition of his vow, and the kingdom replunged into war, shall we find him consistent then?" What pretence is there for representing the renewal of the war as the fruition of Mr. Windham's vow? He gave as one of his reasons for objecting to the peace, that its consequences would put us out of the condition to renew the war, which he thought would soon be necessary. He disapproved of dismantling our fleet and disbanding our army, because he thought much time would not elapse before it would be necessary to equip the one, and recruit the other. There is no inconsistency in endeavouring to avoid peace when we had large naval and military establishments on foot,

foot, and to hesitate in declaring war when those establishments had been let down. As little inconsistency is there in objecting to the immediate ground of war, and in thinking that many occasions had been passed over, on which Ministers had been called upon to have taken up arms. I give no opinion here upon these views of the subject: they may be erroneous; but they are not what they are brought forward to prove; they are not inconsistent.

I should have thought that even those who objected most to the opinions of Mr. Windham, would have seen in him much to admire. His courage and his manliness; his acquirements as a scholar; his manners as a gentleman; the acuteness and ingenuity of his mind, and the general disinterestedness of his conduct.—A “Near Observer” might easily have discovered that an aversion to every thing that is mean is a striking feature of his character. Yet he is represented as a “man of place, a man of time, a man of circumstances, a man of convenience.” He is accused of that which, at such a moment as the present, would be little short of treason. He is charged with impeding and obstructing the national defence. Shall we behold
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him, it is asked, arraying the forces, ballotting the militia, calling out the volunteers? Yes, I reply; we shall behold him *among the foremost in arraying the forces*, not certainly in ballotting the militia, or in calling out the volunteers; but why? because he does not consider those to be the *most efficient modes* of arraying the forces: but in objecting to the measures brought forward by the Government, he proposed others which appeared to him better calculated to attain the object which was in view; and he did not leave a shadow of pretext for the foul deduction of the “Near Observer.” Are we really to think that Mr. Windham did not wish to put forth the best energies of the state for our safety and preservation, because he did not approve the plan of the Ministers; or because, perhaps, he might not think that they knew very well how to carry their own plan into execution?

Much as I admire the character of Mr. Windham, I shall never point to prudence and discretion as his most prominent virtues. Inferior men who possess more of these qualities, will often have great advantages over him. Upon all important political questions, he forms his

own

own judgment without any reference to that of others ; and when he most disagrees in the sentiments of the public, his chivalrous nature seems to impose it as an obligation upon him the more to press and urge his own opposite opinions. Those opinions also he appears to me often to push to extremes. I know not whether the conduct of Mr. Windham be calculated to render him generally popular, but know that no man deserves more credit than himself for an honest and conscientious discharge of public duty.

Mr. Canning is complimented most deservedly for “rare talents” and “private worth,” but he is accused, not with a very good grace, by the author of the “Cursory Remarks,” and without any proof, with libelling those whom he opposes. He is also represented as having become the “instrument of other persons.” Mr. Canning appears to have felt very strongly the incapacity of the present Ministers, and particularly of Mr. Addington ; to have considered them as acting upon no system whatever, and, as well as Lord Grenville, to have founded his opposition upon this ground ; and to have taken an active and a consistent part in endeavouring to enforce this opinion. No pretence whatever is stated

for representing him as acting under the controul of Lord Grenville, which would not equally have applied to any other eminent Statesman, in whose opinions he had coincided, and who had taken the same line as himself. It is a novel doctrine which pervades the whole of the "Cursory Remarks," that if a person supports the Administration, he is supposed to act from the purest and most disinterested motives; but if he opposes their measures, he is looked upon as the instrument of others, or as acting under the influence of the meanest and the basest passions.

The insinuation that Mr. Canning's conduct gives the opposition which Mr. Pitt may have made, or may hereafter make, to any measure of Mr. Addington, "the suspicion of system, preconcert, and policy," is unworthy of a serious answer. What would our author have said of *preconcert* and *system*, if instead of taking different lines (and not without a good deal of dissatisfaction towards each other on that account) Mr. Pitt and Mr. Canning had adopted the same systematic course of opposition?

This is not the first time that such insinuations have been thrown out, and the friends of Mr. Addington (or at least those who professed to be so)

so) never ceased attempting to excite in his mind doubts of the sincerity of Mr. Pitt; Mr. Canning is asked whether he did not feel that (by his conduct) he was throwing "suspicions over that sincerity?" a point upon which he is said to have "exculpated Mr. Pitt with great eloquence, but imperfect success." Mr. Canning attempted no exculpation whatever from such a charge. He treated it as reflecting disgrace upon those alone who could harbour such a sentiment, and rejected the base imputation with scorn and contempt. It was not enough for these pretended friends of Mr. Addington, that Mr. Pitt disapproved highly of Mr. Canning's parliamentary conduct. It appeared as if nothing short of creating an irreconcilable enmity between these men could convince them of Mr. Pitt's sincerity. Perhaps I may be allowed to doubt whether they wished very anxiously for conviction upon this point, for they were at this period labouring to impress upon Mr. Addington's mind, how much his own importance was lessened, and his Administration weakened by his connection with Mr. Pitt, who was represented, so far from giving him aid or assistance, as placing him under the most disadvantageous imputation from his supposed influence. The Old Opposi-

tion lost no opportunity, for reasons which are sufficiently obvious, of enforcing these doctrines both in and out of Parliament. How far at length both parties have succeeded; how far Mr. Addington has suffered his mind to be worked upon, I leave to the public to judge and determine.

With whatever calumnies, however, the "Near Observer" has assailed the character of Lord Grenville, Mr. Windham, and Mr. Canning, his most poisoned arrows are reserved for Mr. Pitt, whose parliamentary conduct is the subject of his most pointed and severe reprehension. His support is deemed "officious," and his opposition "perfidious and unprincipled." His public actions are ascribed to no honourable or public motive whatever. Envy and mortification at the success of Mr. Addington, are supposed at a very early period to have influenced him. "The public," says our author, "could not be brought implicitly to believe either that the acceptance of the new Ministers itself, or at any rate the credit and popularity which they had acquired by the late happy events (the peace, &c.) were altogether agreeable to Mr. Pitt." Mr. Pitt has been often condemned for recommending to the present
Ministers

Ministers the acceptance of office, but it was left for the ingenuity of the "Near Observer" to discover that he was displeased, because they followed his advice. He has also been censured for approving the Treaty of Amiens, even with all the qualifications which accompanied that approval;* but little, I believe, did he ever dream of being told that the *credit* and *popularity* which Ministers had acquired by that work, was a subject so unpleasant to him that it influenced his public conduct *against* them. But "that this Minister (Mr. Addington) should dare to appear worthy of his Majesty's confidence, and carry on his affairs with ability and success, appeared (to Mr. Pitt and his friends) an unpardonable injury and a crime." It is surely hardly necessary for me to examine whether Mr. Pitt possesses so malignant a heart, as to be incapable of enduring the intolerable success of those Ministers whom he had recommended to his Majesty's councils. I am stopped in the outset of such an examination; the very ground-work is wanting. Where, I ask, is this enviable success? Shall I be told by the Near Observer, that it is to be found in the Treaty of Amiens?

* Vide Woodfall's Debates, 3d Nov. 1801.

Of this Treaty he observes, with singular regard to his promise of “ exaggerating nothing,” that Ministers had “ obtained a peace for the country *beyond the hopes of the wisest and the most sanguine of their well wishers*, and they had arrived at it by the gate of victory and success.” Is this then the success which so mortified Mr. Pitt? which appeared in his eyes and in that of his friends to be, on account of its merit, “ an unpardonable injury and a crime?” If the present Ministers really arrived at peace by the gate of victory and success, it was a gate which their predecessors had thrown open for them. It was Mr. Pitt’s victory and success at Copenhagen and in Egypt. But whatever we may think of the policy or impolicy of the late peace (a question which it would be foreign to my subject to enter upon here) can it fairly be looked upon as so very glorious and brilliant as the “ Near Observer” would represent? And does he not very much overrate the value of the peace, for the purpose of exalting the merit of Mr. Addington, and for the sake of giving a shadow of plausibility to the insinuation, that Mr. Pitt’s conduct is to be imputed to the envy which this great and successful measure had created? But let us hear the “ Near Observer” himself upon this subject. “ If,” says he,

he, "there really exists an individual *who ever did confide* in the *duration* of the late peace, I would counsel him to keep his own secret. It would be in vain to charge his drivelling as a crime upon other men. He is *Nature's* fool, and not Mr. Addington's." So that the peace *which was beyond the hopes of the wisest and most sanguine of Mr. Addington's well wishers*, the success of which so galled, vexed, and irritated Mr. Pitt as to incline him to hostility to the Minister, was a peace in the *duration* of which none but a driveller ever confided. It would be a waste of time to comment farther upon this point.

Mr. Addington has been very generally accused of deceiving the public, with respect to the probable continuance of the late peace. From this accusation the "Near Observer" attempts, I think not very successfully, to exculpate him by a reference to his Majesty's speech of the 3d Nov. 1802. "*In my intercourse with foreign powers I have been actuated by a sincere desire for the maintenance of peace. It is nevertheless impossible for me to lose sight of that established and wise system of policy by which the interests of other states are connected with our own; and I cannot therefore be indifferent to any material change*
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in their relative condition and strength. My conduct will invariably be regulated by a due consideration of the actual situation of Europe, and by a watchful solicitude for the permanent welfare of my people."

This paragraph, says the Near Observer, is a "*complete answer*" to all those paltry and futile accusations which have been preferred against Ministers, for having concealed the true state of affairs during the discussion of the bill for the relief of the Prince of Wales ; upon which occasion they are accused of having given a false representation of the probabilities of the permanence of the peace." The sentence here quoted from his Majesty's Speech is a master-piece, in the style of indefinite and unmeaning composition, to be construed hereafter as circumstances and occasions may require ; but never can I admit that it is a complete answer, *or any answer at all*, to the accusation brought against Mr. Addington,—that during the continuance of the peace he kept up the idea of its duration with professions of too sanguine a nature. Not that I mean to insinuate that he intended to deceive the public : I believe that he possesses great facility in deceiving himself, and that the decep-
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tion is always on the side of his wishes. But surely it cannot be forgotten that, until the breaking out of the war, the peace was always represented by the Ministers as being as likely to last as any which had preceded it. The erroneous calculations of the Budget of the 10th of December were stated to be made upon the supposition of peace, and on the discussion of the message respecting the relief of his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, Mr. Addington represented the country as being "*at profound peace.*" But, says the Near Observer, the "interval between the message and the 8th of March (the period at which we were called upon to arm) is but *three* weeks! The whole complaint and charge are therefore confined to three weeks." If it were so, the charge would not be less strong. The nearer the period is brought to the moment of hostility, the less ground could there have been for talking of "*profound peace;*" and we since know, by their own declaration, that Ministers considered the insult and aggression of France as uninterrupted from the treaty of peace to the breaking out of the war.

From the conclusion of the peace to the present time, few occasions have presented them-

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selves for coupling together the name of Addington and *success*. Envy could therefore no longer be looked upon as influencing Mr. Pitt's actions; but it was necessary, in pursuit of the object of our author, to consider them as governed by some other motive equally base and dishonourable. Disappointment, occasioned by the failure of *his negotiation* (as it has been called), is now supposed to have actuated his conduct; how far the transaction alluded to can strictly be called a negotiation; and if so, how far it was *his* negotiation, has been already shewn.

There are very few points in which I wish to agree with the Near Observer. But (though I am convinced that it never could have been a motive of action with Mr. Pitt) I wish I could think with our author that Mr. Pitt felt a sufficient desire to return to his official situation, to have occasioned any thing like the disappointment which is supposed to have taken place, because Mr. Addington's proposition was abandoned; I should in that case feel that the hope of seeing him again in office was, in some degree, strengthened; and I should think that there was a better chance for the safety and prosperity of the country.

I fear

I fear that the fact is otherwise, from every thing I can learn respecting this transaction. Mr. Pitt is said to have disliked the mention of the subject, *without the express permission and approbation of the King*, and (whether from his then doubtful health, or any other cause) to have felt himself relieved when the proceeding was brought to a conclusion. I know not what there was at the period to which I refer, to have rendered it very desirable for a person who had held the situation of Prime Minister with success for seventeen years, and in the most arduous times that this nation ever experienced, "*to accept a seat in the Cabinet,*" *upon the terms dictated by the present Ministers*. I believe the conclusion of this transaction occasioned as little sore disappointment to Mr. Pitt, as the public measures of Ministers had excited mortification on account of their success. It will not be difficult to suggest motives for Mr. Pitt's conduct *more probable* than mortification, disappointment, or the influence of the arguments which Lord Grenville is supposed (most falsely) to have urged to induce him (as it is called) to abandon the Ministry.

A person not blinded, like the Near Ob-
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server, by his aversion to the late Ministers, may perhaps think that it is *just possible* that some difference of opinion with Mr. Addington upon the general subject of finance; that some difference as to the management of our foreign affairs; that some difference in particular as to the conduct of Ministers in the negotiation with France, may have operated on Mr. Pitt's mind. He may have thought the representation of our financial resources on the 10th of December last was not *perfectly* correct; though afterwards he may have thought it of little avail to revise or to comment upon a statement made in contemplation of peace, when war had been declared. He may have thought that the necessary steps to conciliate foreign powers had been omitted, that alliances had been neglected. He may have thought that though the hostile spirit of the First Consul of France was sufficiently manifest, yet that from the Treaty of Amiens to the breaking out of the war, that spirit had been met in a manner more likely to invite and encourage, than to counteract and resist it. He may have communicated these opinions, or at least some of them, to his Majesty's Ministers, and he may have found that they were either rejected as ill founded, or unattended to altogether.

If Mr. Pitt disapproved strongly of the conduct of the Ministers on many points, and particularly of their errors and blunders in the negotiation with France; if, at the same time, he felt that the censure proposed to be passed upon them by Mr. Patten's motion* in the House of Commons, was more severe than the occasion justified; if he thought that at such a moment particularly it was repugnant to the interests of the nation to countenance a measure, the object of which was to force the Ministers from his Majesty's councils; if he felt that it was the duty of Parliament to devote its whole time and attention to the pressing call for national defence, rather than to the inculcation of Ministers; what line of conduct could he have taken upon that question, but that which has been so unjustly condemned? Whether as much attention has been paid to the important point to which he would have directed the sole attention of Parliament, as our situation required; whether the degree of security (whatever it may be) which we enjoy be not to be ascribed to the spirit of the people itself, rather than to any system by which the Ministers have directed that

* Vide Woodfall's Debates 3.1 June.

spirit,

spirit, I will not here inquire : every body will agree that the subject was worthy of immediate, attentive, and serious consideration, and the nation would have been well satisfied if the Ministers had proposed, and the Parliament had adopted, measures better digested, and better suited to the exigency of the moment, than any which were brought forward. Mr. Pitt's uniform object during the remainder of the session was to encourage and support every measure which tended to give strength and vigour to the country ; and whenever this task was neglected by the Ministers, to do all that depended upon him to supply their omissions.

Upon the particular motion brought forward by Mr. Patten, other courses were suggested at the time, as those which it would have been more becoming in Mr. Pitt to have pursued ; but the objection to all of them is, that they begin by asking of him a complete sacrifice of opinion. If “ popularity ” had been his object, it did not require his sagacity to discover that he could not attain that end by forbearing to deliver his opinion. A conscientious feeling of duty to his King and Country could alone determine him to withhold any judgment upon the question ; but no party
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views whatever could possibly enter into such a decision. Mr. Patten's friends, confident that he could not approve the irresolute and inconsistent measures which Ministers had adopted in their whole intercourse with France, and particularly in the late negotiation, and strongly urging the fatal effects to the empire, of want of system and of firmness displayed on that occasion, contended that he should have given a direct vote of censure; while the Ministers, convinced that they had excited a feeling of resentment against the First Consul of France, incompatible with all fair and just investigation of their own conduct, called loudly for examination and decision. They were not deceived in their expectations; all other considerations, their own errors and inconsistencies, were lost in the contemplation of the insolence, ambition, and perfidy of France.* They obtained the favourable decision of a great majority, rather the effect of

* In this debate Mr. T. Grenville delivered a very able speech, in which he examined very fully and very critically the different proceedings of the Government with respect to France; and he condemned very severely the inconsistency of those proceedings. The Ministers suffered the attack to pass not only without an answer, but almost without an observation.

inflamed

inflamed passion than of calm reason ; they obtained it (perhaps in the way most agreeable to themselves) without any examination of the measures which had led to the rupture with France.

From this period all deference for the opinion of Mr. Pitt on the part of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, is looked upon as “ a weakness,” the only one “ the Near Observer has discovered in his character.” Mr. Pitt’s opposition is represented as the most “ aggressive and unrelenting” which could have been exercised ; and we are asked, what possible asperity, malevolence, and rancour of attack, “ could he (Mr. Addington) have experienced, which he did not sustain from the party of his predecessors, who were pledged to give him their zealous, constant, and active support ?”

I recollect but two important questions which were discussed in Parliament subsequently to this period, in which Mr. Pitt took any very active part ; and I should have thought, that the utmost exaggeration of calumny could not have described his conduct upon these occasions, as “ rancorous and malevolent :” the one relating

ing to the mode of raising the supplies, (particularly the Income Tax Bill) and the other the general subject of the defence of the nation. Upon the latter subject the Near Observer is silent, thinking it dangerous perhaps to his cause to touch upon this ground, to remind the public of the suggestions of Mr. Pitt, or of the manner in which those suggestions have been carried into effect by his Majesty's Ministers ; and doubting perhaps whether Mr. Pitt's interference upon this occasion, came under the head of "officious support," or "unrelenting opposition." Upon the other point he enters at large, and, as usual, he founds his censure (as I shall shew) upon mistatement.

Mr. Pitt's parliamentary conduct is represented, as "calculated, in a peculiar manner, to embarrass the administration of the finances," * and this charge is supported by an assertion

* The Near Observer has the following note in proof of this assertion. "So early as the 25th of February, Lord Grenville had disputed Lord Auckland's statement of the finances, asserting that instead of a surplus of *nine* millions in the revenue, there was a deficit of *four*. On the 26th of July, however, the whole of the *six millions and a half surplus of the consolidated fund*, were voted for the supplies of the year, upon the motion of Mr. Addington,

tion that he “ raised a cry, that the faith of Government was violated by including the stockholder in the Income Tax, with every other species of proprietor.” Is this, on the part of the *Near Observer*, ignorance and mistake, or is it wilful misrepresentation? It never was asserted that the faith of Government was violated by including the stockholder in the Income Tax *with* every other person: what Mr. Pitt contended for most forcibly was, that *the*

addington, and in the presence of Mr. Pitt, who made no objection to the statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer; nor has any motion been made by Mr. Gregor, who had given notice. If then gentlemen are acting properly at present, as I do not deny, how will they justify their previous conduct?” Nonsensical confusion! Our author supposes the surplus calculated by Lord *Auckland*, the deficit asserted by Lord *Grenville*, and the sum voted by Mr. *Addington*, to refer to *the same thing*. Whereas the first is, a calculated surplus of revenue, after payment of the interest of the national debt; the second, the supposed deficit of revenue after paying interest of debt, civil list, and all our establishments, calculated upon peace; and the third is the estimated surplus of the consolidated fund, at a subsequent period after the payment of the interest of the debt and civil list, but without any reference to our establishment. Mr. Pitt and Mr. Gregor were of opinion, that Mr. Addington’s statements of the 10th of December were erroneous, and I have never heard it attempted to be proved that they were correct.

stockholder

stockholder should pay EQUALLY with every other proprietor whatever; whereas, as the plan was originally introduced by Mr. Addington, it was proposed that his income, as well as that of the landholder, should be taxed (in cases of income of small amount) at a *higher rate* than certain incomes of the same amount, derived from other sources. “I am compelled, as a Near Observer, to a remark upon this occasion, that the arguments of Mr. Pitt did not appear to have so much weight as his authority, in *obtaining exemptions* for the indolent capital of the stockholder, while every other species of annual income is liable to the just exigency of the state.” Here is an insinuation, that Mr. Pitt obtained for the stockholder some favourable exemption, which was denied to other proprietors; whereas he contended (as I have said) that the income of stockholders should be liable to the just exigency of the state, in the same degree as all other incomes; that if exemptions from the tax were granted to small incomes derived from trade, or from any other source, it was not only an injustice, but a *breach of faith* also, to deny the same exemptions to the stockholder, which would be, in fact, to *tax him higher than those to whom the exemptions were granted*.

If any person still doubts the force of Mr. Pitt's objection, let him look into the Loan Act of the last or of any former year, he will there find a clause by which the faith of Parliament is pledged not to tax the dividends of the public creditor. Surely I am not putting a harsh construction upon this engagement, when I say that at least it is stipulated by this enactment that incomes arising from those dividends (even if the exigency of the state requires a tax upon *all income*, and this description of income is included with the rest) shall not be taxed in a higher proportion than other species of income: to have taxed them higher, then, would evidently have been a *breach of national faith*, yet such would have been the effect if Mr. Addington's suggestion had been adopted.*

*The total misconception of the Near Observer upon this point, he has himself elucidated by the following note. "No person can be plainly absurd enough to contend that an hundred pounds in a man's pocket is not equally contributable whether he has received them from his steward or his stock-broker. The only question is, whether it be a breach of faith to take the tax without expence and inconvenience at the Bank, instead of running after the public creditor when he has carried his dividends to his closet? This cry, however, of Mr. Pitt, has cost us one million and a quarter from the annual resources of the war." Mr. Pitt stated

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The day after* the debate upon this question, the Chancellor of the Exchequer was *weak* enough (as the Near Observer thinks it) to give way upon this point, and he consented *to put the stockholder upon the same footing with respect to the tax as every other proprietor.*

It is painful for me to recollect with how ill a grace he yielded upon this occasion. After stating a few flimsy pretexts for so sudden a change of opinion, (the principal of which was that the *yeomanry* of the country had *expected* the tax to be laid in the manner which Mr. Pitt proposed) he solemnly declared that none of Mr. Pitt's arguments had induced him to make this concession. He surely might have spared himself this useless attempt to treat that reasoning as futile, his opinion distinctly, that the sum received from the steward, the stock-broker, or from any other source, *should be equally contributable.* It was Mr. Addington who proposed the *inequality* against the steward and stock-broker in favour of other classes. The *breach of faith* was never represented as depending upon the circumstance of whether the stock-holder's contribution was paid at the bank or at his house, (a misrepresentation most industriously propagated by the friends of the Ministers) but upon his being required to pay a *larger proportion* upon his income than other individuals.

* Vide Woodfall's Debates 13th and 14th July 1803.

which

which he had upon so many occasions considered as convincing and irresistible. Did he think that he could persuade the Members of the House of Commons that Mr. Pitt's opinion was well founded, but that the arguments by which it was enforced were weak, inapplicable, and unavailing? This was trying the credulity of his friends a little too severely, who were upon this occasion entitled to his favour, if not to his respect. He should have gratefully remembered the vote they had given; he should have considered that they were about to take as short a turn as himself; that they had lifted their voice in favour of the question on one day, and were willing to *declare against* it without a murmur on the next. To refuse them any ground for either one vote or the other, was not treating so much pliancy and obedience with all the fostering kindness which it so much deserved at the hands of a Minister.* Mr. Pitt, whose conduct on this occasion is represented as full of "asperity, rancour, and malevolence;" whose arguments, even at the moment of yielding, Mr. Addington

* One hundred and fifty Members of Parliament voted against Mr. Pitt's proposal on 13th July; and on the 14th resigned their opinions without giving a single reason for the change.

thought fit to slight and to decry, received this reluctant and peevish concession; with no other comment than that he rejoiced that the improvement in his measure which he had suggested had been made, and that he would not canvass the grounds upon which it had been adopted.

As the line that Mr. Pitt took upon this question seems to be the ground upon which the charge is founded, of "rancour and malevolence," it must be permitted to me to say that he had taken great pains to apprise Mr. Addington, through the channel of some of his intimate friends, of the view which he had taken of this question, several weeks before it was proposed in Parliament, in the hope that Mr. Addington might have been induced to make the alterations which were suggested without any public discussion; and Mr. Pitt only brought forward his objection when he found his remonstrance, in the shape I have mentioned, totally disregarded.

It is unnecessary to ask, whether this proceeding be a proof of ill-will towards Mr. Addington; or whether, when an attempt was made to de-
preciate

preciate his arguments, in the manner I have described, his conduct evinced any thing of rancour? It is likely that this attempt excited in Mr. Pitt's mind a feeling which partook more of compassion than of anger; he felt, probably, no disposition to take advantage of a powerful weapon which a weaker adversary had placed in his hand.*

Our author sums up his remarks upon Mr. Pitt's proceedings respecting the financial operations of the Government, in a manner for which, I confess, I was not prepared; but the secret motives of those who affect to act upon principles of purity, justice, and impartiality, are often

* It may fairly be doubted whether, in its effects, the public have derived all the benefit from Mr. Pitt's interference in this measure which it was intended to produce. Mr. Addington had conceded once, and on that account he seemed determined to concede no more. Mr. Pitt was not allowed to improve the measure by any further suggestions; and it was sent forth to the public in the state of *perfection* in which it now appears. If it be still resolved not to adopt any improvement which originates with Mr. Pitt, it is to be hoped that the Ministers themselves will, in the course of the present session, propose such alterations as will at least render the measure intelligible to those who are to *pay*, and practicable to those who are to *act*.

betrayed

betrayed by their own incongruities and contradictions. Who is there who has read the pamphlet on which I am commenting, who has not been struck with astonishment when he arrived at the following sentence? "Nothing, I confess, would give me more satisfaction, in this extreme difficulty, and most arduous crisis of our state, than to hear Mr. Pitt firmly and zealously giving his support to the King's Servants. His financial skill, his commanding eloquence, and his still great influence in the country, would be a tower of strength to his Majesty's Government. The public would be well satisfied, I have no reason to doubt, if the Right Hon. Gentleman would accept a seat in the Cabinet." What! Mr. Pitt, the rancorous and malevolent; Mr. Pitt, whose conduct is "unprincipled, perfidious, corrupt, and profligate;" Mr. Pitt, who deserted his Majesty's Government, from "apprehension and despondency;" Mr. Pitt, who possesses nothing but "the mere gift of eloquence?" and would it really give the Near Observer and the public satisfaction, and, on account of our difficulties too, to see such a man in the Cabinet? What gross inconsistencies will a malevolent mind sometimes discover in endeavouring to give the appearance of candour

to its representations, plausibility to its insinuations, and the character of truth to the efforts of its malignity !

Totally destitute of foundation as are the attacks upon the character of that great and distinguished Statesman, at whom they are chiefly levelled, there is scarcely more ground for the high praise so lavishly heaped upon the Ministers ; they are represented as “ faithful, able, vigorous, and fortunate ;” to their *fidelity* I cordially accede, but I can accompany the Near Observer no further in panegyric. The Peace of Amiens, their great work, was a “ peace of experiment ;” at least, so it was represented to be, by those who made it, as soon as they discovered that it was fast verging towards its end. It may have been (and, I think, was) right, under all the circumstances, to have tried the experiment at the time ; but it has failed, and the Ministers must be contented, not to rank it among their successful measures. I see nothing from the peace to the breaking out of the war, which can be fairly called able, vigorous, or fortunate ; if I look to more recent events, I see less to justify this encomium. I cannot discern any extraordinary merit in the management either of
our

our foreign or domestic concerns. The loss of *Hanover*, in spite of appearances, *may* have been attended with no remissness, no procrastination on the part of the Ministers ; it may have been unavoidable, and it may have been impossible, (though a circumstance deeply to be lamented) to have brought away any part of the army of that country ; it *may* have been right to have discharged the transports taken up for that purpose, while the force was still well disposed and entire. It may have been excusable to have disbelieved all the information respecting the Irish insurrection, *to have been warned*, and *yet to have been taken by surprise*. It might have been politic to have temporized with Holland, it may be still right to temporize with Spain. All these things may possibly be justifiable, but they do not place themselves obviously and naturally, among the records of good fortune or of wisdom. They require much explanation, and some will probably be granted in this Session of Parliament. What shall I say of the conduct of Ministers towards those persons who so nobly stood forth as volunteers for the defence of the nation ? I cannot even invent a justification ; they were by turns caressed and discountenanced, invited and rejected, but (thank God !) they could not

be dispirited. Among the many compliments paid to the Ministers, we are told that "the men are not visible in the acts of their authority," but here they were never out of sight. Acts and amended acts were passed; the influence of Secretaries of State and Secretaries at War was brought forward to expound the statutes; letter after letter was written, and weeks elapsed in explaining explanations; at length the opinion of the crown lawyers was resorted to by the Ministers, for the construction of the acts which they had themselves so recently proposed; and that opinion convinced them and the public how much at variance had been their intentions and their enactments. The volunteers were at last told, not in the most complimentary way, and as a sort of excuse for all the shifting and changing which had taken place, that "the difficulties which had occurred had arisen in a great measure from a zeal and alacrity on the part of the people, which had exceeded even *the hopes* and expectations of the Government."* Never was so plain and simple a measure so confused in the execution; but never can I believe that *Bonaparte* will subdue that spirit

* Vide Mr. Yorke's letter to the Lords Lieutenant, 28th of September, 1803.

which so much tampering and trifling could neither damp nor dishearten.*

I cannot see then, I confess, in these measures, the fruits of the great and rare qualities ascribed to the Ministers. If, however, the Near Observer had contented himself with passing a few fulsome panegyrics upon Mr. Addington, if he had been satisfied with extolling his "firmness," his "fortitude," his "vigour," and his "success," the present Minister would not have been the first who had been complimented for those qualifications in which he was most deficient; and I should have left him in full enjoyment of those harmless congratulations; neither would the mere inconsistencies of the Near Observer have prompted me to have taken up my pen. To represent the expeditions to

* As exemptions both from the militia and army of reserve, appear to be given to the volunteers by the late acts, contrary to the intentions of Ministers, and as the established force is thereby weakened, would it not be expedient to pass a law for rendering the volunteer force more efficient than it is at present, and for assimilating it as much as circumstances will admit, with our regular army? It may also be worth consideration, whether the volunteers throughout the empire should not be placed upon the same footing?

Egypt and to Copenhagen as “hopeless,” when speaking of the *late* Administration, and to consider them as glorious and triumphant, when he has appropriated them to the *present* : to tell us that the peace was “beyond the hope of the wisest and the most sanguine of the well-wishers of Ministers ;” and to treat every man as “a fool” who ever confided in its *duration* : to accuse Mr. Pitt of being “perfidious,” “corrupt,” “unprincipled,” “profligate,” “malevolent,” “rancorous,” as guilty of the basest treachery, —as possessing nothing but “the mere gift of eloquence,” and to represent “his abilities as calculated to sustain the essential interests of the empire,” and to wish that he had a seat in the Cabinet : to censure him for *supporting* the Ministers, which he calls “officious,” and for *opposing* them, which he deems “factious :” to call loudly for unanimity, while he is himself throwing the apple of discord : these, surely, are gross inconsistencies ; they are, indeed, so glaring, that I should have felt it unnecessary to have pointed them out. But when I observe that good-will towards Mr. Addington, is not so powerful an incentive with this writer as rancour and hatred towards others ; when I see him inconsistent to serve the worst purposes ; when

I detect

I detect him mistating facts, misrepresenting opinions, and deducing from his own misrepresentations, conclusions which are injurious to the reputation of the ablest and most upright men in the country; men to whom the nation looks up in this hour of peril as its best hope;—and lastly, when I see these calumnies countenanced by those who ought (if not from higher considerations) from the mere regard to decency and truth, to have suppressed them; I confess I feel that I am discharging a public duty, in endeavouring (however inadequately) to expose the baseness and malignity of this attack, and in vindicating from foul aspersion some of the most illustrious characters in the nation.

Here I should most willingly have closed these remarks, if some other considerations had not been forced upon me by the “Near Observer,” upon which, however, I shall touch very slightly.—The war, we are told, is that which “no policy, no human prudence, no moderation, no forbearance could avert.” I could have desired not to have been challenged upon this point; and I wish I could cordially agree in every part of this opinion; but I never can contemplate the conduct of the Government during the peace, and particularly

particularly during the negotiation which preceded the rupture, without deep and heartfelt sorrow ; because I never can look at that conduct without thinking it at least possible that a firm, fixed, and invariable system might have preserved our honour and avoided the present contest. I cannot dignify with the character of “ forbearance” and “ moderation” what appears to me to be more correctly described as ill-timed concession and submission ; and when I find that credit is taken for “ firmness and conciliation,” I must examine how these dispositions have been employed. The application of them may be the effect of weakness as well as of virtue. If we have been conciliating where we ought to have been firm, and firm where we ought to have been conciliating, it is in vain indeed to claim merit for the exercise of those qualities.—Was it conciliation which induced us to cede our conquests to France, while justice was denied to British subjects ? Was it conciliation which led us tamely to remonstrate against the introduction of the French military-commercial commissioners into this country, instead of transporting those “ accredited spies,” with indignation, from our shores ? Was it firmness which dictated the order for the retention of the

Cape

Cape of Good Hope when a French army had invaded Switzerland? Was it conciliation which prompted us to countermand those orders and give it up to the Dutch, when, in spite of repeated remonstrance, a French army kept possession of Holland itself? * Do not let it any more be said, that the Dutch themselves desired us not to interfere; the very request proved their abject submission to France; it should have been taken as a warning to us (at least while French dominion lasted) to have kept it for ourselves. But who can doubt the anxious desire of the Ministers to preserve the peace! Nobody can doubt it: their wish was as ardent and sincere as the means which they took to accomplish it were certain of proving destructive to their own object.

Let me draw an illustration from private life.

* The order for the retention of the Cape of Good Hope was sent out by Lord Hobart's letter of 7th of October, 1802. On 29th of October, 5th of November, and 12th of November following, Mr. Liston represented that the French troops, to the amount of above ten thousand, remained in Holland, contrary to treaty. Without any satisfaction being given upon this point, orders were sent out for the restitution of the Cape to the Dutch on 16th of November. Vide Official Correspondence.

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How

How constantly does it happen that the man who will endure the most to avoid a duel, is, from that very disposition, in the end obliged to fight? He concedes till he is ashamed of concession, he tolerates insult after insult,* he finds his character fast sinking in the world, his conscience at length reproaches him with *too much submission*, and he draws his sword upon the first unfounded or inadequate pretence.†

Without entering into the merits of the Peace of Amiens, it was not difficult to perceive, at a very early period, that it could only be preserved by a *firm, manly, and uniform* system. We should not, in the first instance, have entered into stipulations respecting the future state and government of the island of Malta, without the full authority and consent of those powers upon whom the execution of those stipulations depended; but, in every point of view, we should have adjusted the final settlement of that island, the only difficult point the negotiation presented, *with our conquests in our hands*. We should have insisted that the restitution of those con-

* "One continued series of insult," &c. Vide Declaration.

† Vide Message of 8th March 1803.

quests should have been accompanied on the part of France with pacific dispositions and pacific measures. In no case should our conduct have been *submissive*. If we had manifested this determination at the beginning, and acted upon it throughout ; if we had adopted that system of *precaution* and *firmness* so strenuously recommended by Mr. Pitt, and upon which, in the discussion of the preliminaries of peace, he represented our security to depend—who is there who can say the war *might* not have been avoided ?

It is possible, however, that no policy could have prevented the war ; that no human prudence could have counteracted the insolence and injustice, conciliated the hostile mind, or checked the insatiable ambition of the First Consul of France. If that be true, at least the line I have suggested would have rendered the justice of our cause manifest and apparent to all Europe : whereas, if I am rightly informed, (and it is a point upon which I hope I am mistaken) *the whole Continent looks upon the case as against us*. We are falsely considered as having repented of the Treaty of Amiens, and as having sought an opportunity of annulling it. We have so contrived, that we hold out the appearance

pearance of retaining Malta, contrary to the express conditions of our treaty. This is stated as the occasion of the war, and plausibly at least we are represented as having been guilty of a violation of national faith.

When a good cause requires much explanation, it is seldom unjust to impute that circumstance to culpable neglect and mismanagement; but mismanagement on our part is no vindication of repeated insult on the part of France. It is no justification of aggression that the party aggrieved is too much disposed to submit. Whatever therefore may be my opinion of the mismanagement of Ministers, I have no hesitation in declaring my full conviction in the justice of our cause; nay, the very principle at length publicly avowed by France,—that this nation has no concern whatever in her aggrandizement on the Continent, must be, whenever acted upon, incompatible with a state of peace.

The “Near Observer” asks if these are times “to govern phrases or to frame sentences?” Nobody will accuse him of governing phrases, either in praise or in censure. Whether his work exhibits any thing of the easy or natural expression
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of honest feeling, or the formal adjustment of sentences framed and laboured to serve a purpose, I will not enquire. It is to the tendency, not to the style and composition of his work that I apply myself; but if this be not a time to govern phrases, sure I am that it is not a time to withhold opinions. If in proportion as danger approaches, we are to be silent as to the best means of counteracting it, we lose one of the great advantages of a free government.

I would obstruct none of the measures of the Administration; but in pointing out the past, I would endeavour to warn against the commission of future errors. I would recommend to those necessary attentions and exertions, in which we have been most deficient. I would exhort to those energies on which, I think, depends, in this hour of danger, the salvation of the state.

The nation, we are told, "governs itself under the present Ministers, and for them." That the nation governs itself in a great measure is but too true; that it governs itself for the Ministers is a position which I do not comprehend. Differing as I do with the "Near Observer" as
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to their rare merits, I am ready to admit that some of them possess eminent talents; and certainly I have no desire to brand any of them as “perfidious, corrupt, unprincipled, or profligate.” I believe they deserve those stigmatizing epithets as little as those persons to whom the “Near Observer” has thought fit to apply them. But, collectively, I do not think they possess sufficient ability to direct successfully the complicated affairs of the nation; and unless recently they have much changed their opinion of their own powers, or think the circumstances of the nation have become less difficult and embarrassing, there is scarcely one of them, I believe, who does not agree with me in this opinion. For some of those Ministers I entertain a very high consideration; and of the private character of Mr. Addington in many respects I think well. But truth compels me to add that, as a public man, he has disappointed the expectations which were formed of him, and has not proved himself qualified for the arduous duties he has to fulfil. The habits of his life have led him to the consideration of subjects totally different from those which now occupy, or rather harass, his mind. In the Speaker’s chair he had great merit, but *complaisance*, and *management*,

ment, did much, and often assumed the appearance of higher qualifications ; but the difficulty of the present day is neither to be managed nor compromised, it is to be met alone by vigour, firmness, and decision ; qualities in which he appears to be peculiarly deficient. Considering his means and resources, and the state and circumstances of the nation, never did any man appear to me to stand in a situation of such tremendous responsibility.

It is one of the first duties arising out of that responsibility, to represent things and persons in a true and faithful light in that quarter in which much must necessarily be learnt from such representation. No man is more courteous than Mr. Addington ; no man takes so much pains to recommend himself universally. We cannot suppose that he has been deficient in every dutiful attention (so justly due from all) in the quarter alluded to. It is to be hoped that in recommending himself, in advancing his own pretensions, he has been careful not to depreciate those of others ; but it is alarming and unaccountable to see the great talents and experience of the country excluded from a share in its Executive Government, in this hour of general anxiety.

It has been recommended as the policy of weak states to sow dissensions among its enemies, as the best hope of security. I cannot suppose that at such a moment as the present, Mr. Addington acts upon this system with respect to the different political parties in the country ; but if those who govern are not looked up to with confidence, it will almost necessarily follow, that our ablest statesmen will take different lines, and we shall be deprived of the full use and benefit of the great talents to be found in the nation. In a difficult crisis all should lend their best assistance ; but men will doubt the success even of well digested and efficient measures in unskilful hands ; they will be backward in offering suggestions, if they find their plans marred or confused in the execution. Our author tells us that, “ under the present Ministers, we must fight for all that is dear and sacred to humanity. By their side we shall conquer or lie down.” I hope we are not reduced to that predicament, but if we are, *Britons will not lie down*. Under abler and more experienced leaders our task might be easier, and our sufferings less severe ; but the question we have to consider is of a higher nature than the preference for one man, or the distrust of another.

another. Every thing is at stake. *Libertas et omnia nostra in dubio.* It is a question between the fullest enjoyments, and the bitterest miseries of human life—between the proudest glory and the most abject humiliation.

If ever this nation was involved in a contest which ought to call forth all its energy and enthusiasm, it is that in which we are now engaged. We are threatened with destruction by the haughty insolence of an invading foe, by him who most unfortunately for the happiness of the world, possesses greater means of annoyance than for centuries past has been centered in the hands of any one man. But our safety depends upon ourselves—our exertions are called for by every just and honourable sentiment; they are animated by the bright example of a beloved King, who will “share our dangers in the defence of our constitution, our religion, our laws, and independence.”

A free state will ever be considered as an offending neighbour, to a despotic Government: and we are looked upon by the Chief Consul of France, as guilty of every species of offence and provocation. The influence of liberty in our happy

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land,

land, has enabled us to counteract the disparity of numbers, we have put forth the energies of freemen, and we have been for centuries past the successful rivals of France. We have held out the example of a constitution which she envies but cannot imitate. Of the nations of Europe we have alone dared firmly to resist the fatal progress of French principles. These are among our crimes. Let us look at the character of him whom revolutionary means have placed on the summit of power, and ask ourselves whether we shall be forgiven?—No—If the threatened attempt should be made, and it were possible to suppose that we could fail in the struggle, no words which I can use would convey an idea of the wretchedness of our lot. In vain should we look for the extent of our sufferings, even to those unhappy countries which having been lulled by fair promises into imaginary security, have afterwards been desolated by the fury of revolutionary armies. If we fail, neither let us flatter ourselves with the hope, nor harbour the desire, of mercy. If we fail, we shall be considered less as the captives of conquest, than the victims of revenge:—but that we shall be triumphant I have the firmest conviction

viction, because I have witnessed that gallant spirit which has pervaded the country; because I know that Britons will readily risk their lives for the preservation of those inestimable blessings which their ancestors have so nobly bled to obtain; because I believe that there are few among us who would not prefer honourable death to ignominious existence; and because I am sure that if we are actuated by these sentiments, though possibly from a desperate attempt of the enemy, England may suffer, yet *France cannot succeed.*

23d Nov. 1803.

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